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THE MATERIAL BURDEN TEST: THE BETTER
METHOD OF DETERMINING TAKINGS ISSUES
ARISING UNDER SECTION 621(a)(2) OF THE CABLE
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY ACT OF 1984
Assume the owner of a planned development is considering what kind
of television system to install for future residents. The owner may choose
to forego the services of the typical cable system operator and instead select
an alternative system. For example, the owner may be interested in installing
a satellite master antenna television system (SMATV) on the premises. Such
a system can provide the tenants with television programming that is equal
in diversity and quality to a regular cable television system.' Furthermore,
because-SMATV systems traditionally are not franchised and, therefore, not
required to pay a franchise fee, SMATV system operators may enter into
contracts providing owners with a share of the revenues derived from the
tenants. 2 What happens, however, if the local cable operator refuses to bow
out gracefully? Does a cable franchisee have the right of access to the
private premises even if the owner wishes to grant access only to the satellite
system?
In an attempt to answer this question, Congress enacted the Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (Cable Act). 3 Section 621(a)(2) provides:
Any franchise shall be construed to authorize the construction of a
cable system over public rights-of-way, and through easements,
which is within the area to be served by the cable system and which
have been dedicated for compatible uses .... 4
A dilemma lies in the judicial interpretations of section 621(a)(2).' No one
disputes that section 621(a)(2) gives cable companies a right of access to
some easements and rights-of-way. 6 The legislative history of the Cable Act
1. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 82 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.
& ADmN. NEws 4719 (stating how SMATV can be equivalent to cable television
service).
2. See id. (stating that SMATV's are not required to pay franchise fees and, therefore,
are willing to share revenues with landowners).
3. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§521-59 (1988).
4. Cable Act §621(a)(2); 47 U.S.C. §541(a)(2).
5. See infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (describing split among courts considering
whether §621(a)(2) of Cable Act includes private easements).
6. See Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 909
(11th Cir. 1990) (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-934 stating that §621(a)(2) gives cable companies
access to "compatible" easements including easements or rights-of-way dedicated for electric,
gas, or other utility transmission); Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral's Cove Assoc., 835
F.2d 1359, 1362 n.5 (lth Cir. 1988) (same); Cable Holdings, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund
VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 871, 873 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (same); Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area
Cable TV Co., 183 Mich. App. 597, 602, 456 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (same);
see also Ferris, Access to Premises: Legislation & Litigation, 245-46, in CABLE TELEVISION LAW
1989 (Practicing Law Institute ed. 1989) (noting that all courts considering issue have found
that §621(a)(2) of Cable Act provides some right of access).
CODE CONG.
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describes the "compatible" easement of section 621(a)(2) as "an easement'7
or right-of-way dedicated for electric, gas or other utility transmission."
The courts, however, disagree on whether "compatible" easements include
private easements in addition to easements dedicated for public uses. 8 Several
judicial opinions hold that section 621(a)(2) provides cable companies a
right of access to private easements set aside for utilities. 9 Alternatively,

other opinions provide that section 621(a)(2) authorizes no right of access
to private easements.

0

Understanding why the courts disagree on this issue

necessitates consideration of not only the judicial opinions themselves, but
also the purposes of the Cable Act, the changes made in the Cable Act

during the legislative process, the unfinished text of the legislative history
released with the Cable Act, and a brief look at the law of eminent domain."
Congress enacted the Cable Act to amend the Communications Act of

1934, a law written long before the advent of cable television.

2

Legislators

feared the then-present repetitive and burdensome regulatory structure placed

cable television at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace., 3 One
purpose of the Cable Act's national policy was the replacement of the
4
miscellany of local, state and federal regulations.'

7. H.R. RPP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
Naws at 4696 (describing "compatible" easements as those dedicated for electric, gas
or other utility transmission).
8. Compare Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905,
911 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that cable company had right of access to private utility easements
ADMIN.

in development) with Media General Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of CoOwners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 913 (E.D. Va. 1990) (holding that Cable Act did not create right
of mandatory access to private utility easements).
9. See, e.g., Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905,
911 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (holding that "compatible easements" of Cable Act include private utility
easements); Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral's Cove Assoc., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363 (11th
Cir. 1988) (same); Centel Cable Television Co. v. Burg & DiVosta Corp., 712 F. Supp. 176,
178 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (same).
10. See, e.g., Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 162 (3rd Cir. 1989)
(holding that §621(a)(2) of Cable Act does not authorize access by cable companies to multiunit dwellings); Media General Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners,
737 F. Supp. 903, 913 (E.D. Va. 1990) (holding cable company could not use §621(a)(2) to
gain access to private utility easements); Cable Assocs., Inc. v. Town & Country Management
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 582, 586 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (same).
11. See infra notes 12-77 and accompanying text (providing background material on
purposes, legislative amendments and printed legislative history of Cable Act, as well as
overview of law of eminent domain).
12. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, §601(1), 47 U.S.C. §§521(1) (1988).
13. See S. REP. No. 67, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1983) (noting that unnecessary and
burdensome regulations place cable companies at competitive disadvantage with other providers
of similar services).
14. 130 CONG REc. H10,435 (daily ed. Oct 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth)(stating
that Cable Act's national policy would replace "patchwork" of state, municipal and federal

cable regulations); see also Meyerson, The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984: A
Balancing Act on the Coaxial Wires, 19 GA. L. REv. 543, 545 (1985) (noting that, because
cable systems cross public rights-of-way, local governments adopted their own cable regulations,
resulting in regulations that varied depending on the municipality).
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The Cable Act also emphasizes the concept that, as a First Amendment
speaker, cable television should provide individuals with the ability to send
and receive the widest possible spectrum of information from a diverse
range of information sources.' 5 Section 621(a)(3) of the Cable Act, which
gives franchising authorities the power to require that cable operators
provide access to certain channels for free public use on a nondiscriminatory
basis, allows individuals to send information in a virtual free marketplace

of ideas.' 6 Believing that these public access channels were the equivalent
to a speaker's soapbox or a printed leaflet, 7 the drafters of the Cable Act
intended these channels to be free from any government editorial control
except reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.18 One commentator
views public access cable channels as the contemporary equivalent to a city
street or a street in a company town where the owner cannot deny the right
I
to exercise free speech. 19
The right of citizens to receive information via cable television follows
naturally from the First Amendment right of speakers to send that information. 20 The drafters of the Cable Act felt that cable operators' First
Amendment rights to broadcast a free flow of information would be
worthless if citizens could be denied cable access simply because they were

15. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 31, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws at 4668 (citing First Amendment goal of "widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources" described in Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
16. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, §611, 47 U.S.C. §531 (1988). Compare
Cable Act §611(a), 47 U.S.C. §531(a) (granting franchising authorities power to require that
cable operators provide public access channels) with Federal Communications Comm'n v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979) (holding that FCC rule requiring cable
systems to offer channels for public use went beyond Commission's regulatory powers).
17. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 30, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMI. NEws at 4667 (describing cable television public access channels as equivalent to
speaker's soapbox or printed leaflet).
18. See id. (noting public access channels will provide wide diversity of information to
public without content based regulation); see also Meyerson, supra note 14, at 587 (noting
how Cable Act rules concerning public access channels do not regulate specific content of
programming, but apply only reasonable content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions).
19. See Meyerson, supra note 14, at 585 (comparing public access channels to streets of
company town in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)). Meyerson analogizes public access
channels as equivalent vehicle for communication and free expression as streets of company
town in Marsh. Id. at 585. The Marsh court held that the owner of a company town could
not abridge the First Amendment rights of citizens to speak and listen because the streets of
the company town were equivalent to a public municipality as far as a place of communication.
Id. (citing Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508-09).
20. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969) (holding that it is "the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial" when Court is
considering First Amendment rights of broadcasters); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred
Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (treating cable operators as First Amendment
speakers); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1421 (l1th Cir. 1985) (noting that regulation of
obscene material on cable television represented balance between First Amendment rights of
broadcasters and willing adult listeners against interests of city).
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tenants subject to the editorial decisons of the landowner. 21 In this "information age,'"'2 the Cable Act recognized that access to cable networks is
not only important politically, but also socially, economically, and culturally. 2 Access is especially important considering that new interactive cable
television technology provides two way communication. 24
The drafters of the Cable Act promoted the citizen's right to receive
information in several ways. 25 The first was a guarantee of universal cable
television service to all neighborhoods of a cable service area, regardless of
whether the neighborhood was a low income area. 26 A second step was the
drafting of provisions that gave cable companies mandatory access to
individual citizens living in certain buildings and developments. 27 As a bill
reported out of the House Committee on Energy & Commerce, the cable
legislation contained two different mandatory cable television access provi28
sions .
Section 621(a)(2) provided:
Any franchise shall be construed to authorize the construction of a
cable system over public rights-of-way, and through easements,
which is within the area to be served by the cable system and which
have been dedicated for compatible uses. ..29
Section 633 provided:
(a) The owner of any multiple-unit residential or commercial building or manufactured home park may not prevent or interfere with

21. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 36, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMUN. NEws at 4673 (noting how Cable Act's goal of diversity of cable programming
would be at mercy of editorial decisions of landlords unless Cable Act also regulated consumer
access to cable); see also Meyerson, supra note 14, at 603 n. 349 (stating that motive of
promoting increased access to reception of cable television is inherent throughout Cable Act).
22. See 130 CONG REc. H10,435 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984) (statement of Rep. Wirth)
(stating that Americans, standing on threshold of informational revolution, stood to benefit
from delivery of cable television into their homes).
23. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 36, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws at 4673 (stating political, economic, social and cultural importance of cable
television reception).
24. See id. at 29 (noting some cable systems have "two-way" capability); see also H.
ZUCKMAN, M. GAYNES, T. CARTER, J.DEE, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW IN A NuTsHE., 514°15 (West 1988)(describing advancements in cable technology that have produced two-way
communication systems in which, for example, viewers are able to receive information about
events and then order tickets to same events at touch of button).
25. See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (describing universal service and
mandatory access requirements).
26. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, §621(a)(3), 47 U.S.C. §541(a)(3) (1988).
27. H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §621(a)(2), §633 (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP.
No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984) (authorizing mandatory cable access to not only
easements, but also to developments or buildings where resident requests cable service).
28. Id.
29. H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §621(a)(2) (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 934,

98th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984).
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the construction or installation of facilities necessary for a cable
system, consistent with this section, if cable service or other communications service has been requested by a lessee or owner ...

of

a unit in such a building or park.
(b)(1) A State or franchising authority may, and the Commission
shall, prescribe regulations which provide(A) that the safety, functioning, and appearance of the premises
and the convenience and safety of other persons not be adversely
affected by the installation or construction of facilities necessary
for a cable system;
(B) that the cost of the installation, construction, operation, or
removal of such facilities be borne by the cable operator or subscriber, or both;
(C) that the owner be justly compensated by the cable operator for
any damages caused by the installation, construction, operation, or
removal of such facilities by the cable operator;
(D) methods for determining just compensation under this section.30
The provisions of section 633(d) read:
(d) In prescribing methods under subsection (b)(1)(D) for determining just compensation, consideration shall be given to(1) the extent to which the cable system facilities physically occupy
the premises;
(2) the actual long-term damage which the cable system facilities
may cause to the premises;
(3) the extent to which the cable system facilities would interfere
with the normal use and enjoyment of the premises; and
(4) the enhancement in value of the premises resulting from the
3
availability of services provided over the system. '
At this stage in the legislative process, the cable bill represented a broad
Congressional emphasis on the First Amendment rights of cable companies
and tenants. 32 Before the bill could become law, however, legislators concerned with the protection of private property rights sponsored an amendment to the bill. 33 Adopted during the Senate-House Conference on the bill,
the amendment deleted almost all of the text of section 633 and its broad
grant of cable access to apartment buildings and residential units.3 4 The
30. H.R. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §633 (1984), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1984).
31. Id.
32. See H.R. REP. No 98-934, supra note 1, at 36, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ArDm.. NEws at 4673 (describing how consumer access to cable is integral to cable bill).
33. See 130 CONG. REc. S14,286 (daily ed. Oct. 11 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood)
(listing amendment No. 15 to cable bill); see-also H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at
134-35, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws at 4736-37 (statement of Rep.
Fields) (fearing original §633 of Cable Act would have abrogated property rights of landowners).
34. See 130 CONG. REc. S14,286 (daily ed. Oct 11, 1984) (statement of Sen. Packwood)
(describing changes to §§621(a)(2) and 633 in amendments to Cable Act).
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amendment, however, retained the installation cost and damage compensation standards from sections 633(b)(1)(A), (B), & (C) by moving them to
section 621(a)(2).3 5 By deleting and re-drafting this section, Congress apparently backed down from a broad grant of access to a landlord's property
for the First Amendment benefit of tenants to a more middle ground
approach codified in section 621(a)(2). 3 6 The resulting section 621(a)(2) of
the cable legislation still authorizes cable access, but limits it to certain
areas:
Any franchise shall be construed to authorize the construction of a
cable system over public rights-of-way, and through easements,
which is within the area to be served by the cable system and which

have been dedicatedfor compatible uses, except that in using such
easements the cable operator shall ensure(A) that the safety, functioning, and appearance of the property

and the convenience and safety of other persons not be adversely
affected by the installation or construction of facilities necessary

for a cable system;
(B) that the cost of the installation, construction, operation, or
removal of such facilities be borne by the cable operator or subscriber, or a combination of both; and
(C) that the owner of the property be justly compensated by the
cable operator for any damages caused by the installation, construc-

tion, operation, or removal of such facilities by the cable operator.
37
(emphasis added)
Despite this middle ground approach, the question remains whether
Congress intended private easements to be included as "compatible ease-

ments" under section 621(a)(2). 3 To answer the question, courts have relied
on both the Cable Act's legislative history and the canons of statutory
interpretation. 39 The text of the legislative history is of questionable value

because Congress did not update it to reflect the re-drafting of the man-

35. Cable Communications Policy Ac of 1984, §621(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. §541(a)(2) (1988).
36. See HousE REPORT No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 134-35, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4736-37 (statement of Rep. Fields) (noting that his amendment to
Cable Act §633 does not violate First Amendment, yet eliminates violation of private property
rights).
37. Cable Act §621(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. §541(a)(2).
38. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (discussing dispute whether compatible
easements include private easements).
39. See Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating
legislative history of §§621(a)(2) and 633 indicated that "compatible" easements of Cable Act
did not include private easements); Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co., 183
Mich. App. 597, 605, 456 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (stating legislative history
suggested a broad reading of "compatible" easements); Media General Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah
Condominium Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 909 (E.D. Va. 1990) (using principles
of statutory interpretation to gauge congressional intent behind changes made in cable bill
during Senate House conference).
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datory access provisions. 40 The legislative history, therefore, addresses the
original section 633 and that section's emphasis on presenting broad cable
access to tenants of apartment buildings. 41 Consequently, courts relying on
the text of the legislative history reach different interpretations on whether
42
section 621(a)(2) authorizes access through private easements.
Some courts look beyond the legislative history and rely on the principles
of statutory interpretation to gauge congressional intent.43 Like the problem
in many statutory interpretation situations, however, courts make opposite,
but equally strong, arguments concerning the intent behind the same redrafting of the cable legislation. 44 Convincing arguments exist that section

40. See H.R. RaP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 36-37, 79-83, reprinted in -1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADum,. NEws at 4673-74, 4716-20 (containing legislative history of §633 of

Cable Act even though amendment to bill deleted §633 before bill became law).
41. See id. (containing legislative history of deleted mandatory cable access provision);
see also supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing §633's emphasis on broad cable
access).
42. Compare Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1989)
(stating legislative history of §§621(a)(2) and 633 indicated that "compatible" easements of
Cable Act did not include private easements) with Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable
TV Co., 183 Mich. App. 597, 605, 456 N.W.2d 425, 428 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (stating
legislative history suggested broad reading of "compatible" easements).
43. See Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 156-58 (3d Cir. 1989) (using
principles of statutory interpretation to gauge congressional intent behind changes made in
Cable Act during Senate-House conference); Media General Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 909 (E.D. Va. 1990) (same); Cable Assocs.,
Inc. v. Town & Country Management Corp. 709 F. Supp. 582, 585 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (same);
Cable Holdings, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 871, 874 (N.D. Ga.
1986) (same).
44. Compare Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1989)
(concluding re-drafting of §621(a)(2) indicates no congressional authorization for takings) with
Cable Holdings, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 871, 874 (N.D. Ga.
1986) (concluding re-drafting of §621(a)(2) indicates Congress intended to compensate for
takings).
Viewing the placement of cable wires in a private easement as a taking, Woolley and
other cases reason that if the drafters of the Cable Act had intended it to authorize a taking,
the drafters would have provided just compensation provisions for the taking of property in
§621(a)(2). See Woolley, 867 F.2d at 158; Media General Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium
Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 910 (E.D. Va. 1990); Cable Assocs., Inc. v. Town
& Country Management Corp., 709 F. Supp. 582, 585 (E.D. Pa. 1989). These cases view the
provisions of the original §633(b)(1)(D) as sufficient just compensation measures. Woolley,
867 F.2d at 157; Sequoyah, 737 F. Supp. at 909; Town & Country, 709 F. Supp. at 585.
Because Congress deleted the provisions in §633(b)(1)(D) rather than transferring them to
§621(a)(2) along with §§633(b)(1)(A), (B), and (C), this line of cases concludes that Congress
did not intend to authorize a taking. Woolley, 867 F.2d at 157-58; Sequoyah, 737 F. Supp.
at 910; Town & Country, 709 F. Supp. at 585. These cases infer that the compensation for
any damages language of §633(b)(1)(C), now incorporated in §621(a)(2), does not provide just
compensation for any taking like the provisions in §633(b)(1)(D). Woolley, 867 F.2d at 15758; Sequoyah, 737 F. Supp. at 910; Town & Country, 709 F. Supp. at 585. The basic premise
of this line of cases is that, because §633(b)(1)(C) and §633(b)(1)(D) co-existed, they were not
meant to compensate for the same thing. Woolley, 867 F.2d at 157-58; Sequoyah, 737 F.
Supp. at 910; Town & Country, 709 F. Supp. at 585. The Cable Act, therefore, does not
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621(a)(2) intends to convey a right of access to private easements and
convincing arguments exist that no such intent is present.4 Each argument
mentions the same basic congressional actions as indicative of the intentions
of Congress in drafting
the Cable Act, but each argument's conclusion
46
remains contradictory.

A thorough analysis of the section 621(a)(2) disputes, therefore, requires
something more than an assessment of each court's analysis of the legislative
history and use of statutory interpretation. 47 Analysis of section 621(a)(2)
disputes necessitates consideration of section 621(a)(2) as a compromise
between two competing forces: legislators supporting the vindication of First

Amendment rights through the advancement of cable television and legis-

authorize a taking. Woolley, 867 F.2d at 157-58; Sequoyah, 737 F. Supp. at 910; Town &
Country, 709 F. Supp. at 585.
Conversely, in Cable Holdings, the plaintiff cable company provided cable service to
defendant's apartment complex until the defendant terminated the plaintiff's contract. Cable
Holdings, 678 F. Supp. at 872. The plaintiff brought suit to determine whether the plaintiff
had a right of access under §621(a)(2) of the Cable Act. Id. The Cable Holdings court agreed
with the Third Circuit approach, that the granting of access to a private easement is a "taking
per se". Id. at 874. The court in Cable Holdings, however, reasoned that the Cable Act
authorizes a taking of private property because the compensation for damages provisions
remaining in §621(a)(2)(C) are sufficient to provide just compensation. Id.
The Cable Holdings court used the following statutory interpretation: the deletion of
§633(b)(1)(D) did not eliminate just compensation provisions from §621(a)(2) because the
original §621(a)(2) cross-referenced the provisions of the original §633 and the amendment to
the Cable Act transferred the majority of these provisions to §621(a)(2) when §633 was
dropped. Id. Congress, therefore, intended §621(a)(2) to create the right of access to private
easements while §633 merely contained the standards governing the exercise of that right. Id.
Accordingly, Cable Holdings held that the plaintiff cable company had a right of access to
private easements under §621(a)(2). Id. at 875.
In separate statutory interpretation, both the Sequoyah and Town & Country courts held
that §621(a)(2)'s use of the word "dedicated" should be read in a legal sense because of the
taking per se issue. The courts reasoned that Congress intended this language to cover only
easements that already had been conveyed to the public, thus eliminating the need for any
takings analysis. Sequoyah, 737 F. Supp. at 910; Town & Country, 709 F. Supp. at 585. But
see Cable Holdings, 678 F. Supp. at 873 (stating in dicta that no requirement exists that
§621(a)(2)'s "compatible" easements be publicly dedicated). Cf. Greater Worcester Cablevision,
Inc. v. Carabetta Enters., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1244, 1258 (D. Mass. 1985) (noting argument of
owner that Congress set up §621(a)(2) only to stop inflexible utility companies from refusing
to share easements with cable franchises).
45. See Meyerson, Amending The Oversight: Legislative Drafting and The Cable Act, 8
CARDOZo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 233, 242-43 (1990) (discussing how courts are uncertain when
interpreting deletion of §633 during enactment of Cable Act). The author suggests that a redraft of the Cable Act should address this confusion. Id. at 243.
46. Compare Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 156-58 (3d Cir. 1989)
(noting that deletion of §633 and re-drafting of §621(a)(2) indicated Congress did not intend
to convey right of access to private easements) with Greater Worcester Cablevision v. Carabetta
Enters., 682 F. Supp. 1244, 1259 (D. Mass. 1985) (reasoning that §621(a)(2) which emerged
from re-drafting indicates Congress meant to include private easements).
47. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing conflicting judicial results
on "compatible" easement question from use of legislative history and statutory interpretation).
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lators concerned with the protection of private property rights. 48 With this
compromise in mind, one plausibly can read section 621(a)(2) as granting
access to private easements.4 9 This interpretation advances the First Amendment goal of providing wide public access to cable television that Congress
enumerated in the Cable Act's stated purposes: encouraging the growth and
development of cable systems"° , promoting competition in the cable industry",
and creating an environment where cable will flourish. 2 At the same time,
a reading that section 621(a)(2) provides access to private easements reflects
Congress' concern for private property fights because section 621(a)(2) limits
cable access to specified easements, rather than allowing virtually unrestricted cable access as the deleted Cable Act section 633 did in its provi3
sions.1
The majority of courts that have considered section 621(a)(2) support
54
the interpretation that section 621(a)(2) grants access to private easements.
A few courts, however, do not accept this interpretation because the courts
reason that, if section 621(a)(2) authorized access to private easements, then
that section would effectuate a taking of private property without provisions
for just compensation. 5 The reasoning of these dissenting courts raises a
48. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note I at 36-37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE

& ADmnw. NEws at 4673-74 (stating how Cable Act reflects balance between First
Amendment and property rights); see Meyerson, supra note 14, at 545 (noting that key to
understanding Cable Act is to view it as compromise).
49. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (proposing that including private
easements as "compatible" easements reflects Congressional compromise of §621(a)(2)).
50. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, §601(2), 47 U.S.C. §521(2) (1988); see
also supra notes 15-31 and accompanying text (describing Cable Act's emphasis on vindicating
First Amendment rights of cable television speakers and listeners).
51. Id. at §601(6), 47 U.S.C. §521(6).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 20, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmn . NEws at 4657 (listing purposes of Cable Act, including creating environment in
which cable will flourish).
53. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text (listing text of cable access provisions
§621(a)(2) and §633); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 36-37, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMw. NEWS at 4673-74 (stating that §633 recognized property rights of
owners by assuring them full compensation for cable operators' use of their land). If the
virtually unrestricted cable access of §633 recognized owner's property rights, then cable access
restricted to certain easements under §621(a)(2) should recognize owner's property rights even
more. Cable Act §621(a)(2); 47 U.S.C. §541(a)(2).
54. Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 911 (lth
Cir. 1990) (holding §621(a)(2)'s "compatible" easements include private easements); Centel
Cable Television Co. v. Admiral's Cove Assoc., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 1988) (same);
Centel Cable Television Co. v. Burg & DiVosta Corp., 712 F. Supp. 176, 178 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(same); Cable Holdings, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 871, 875
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (same); Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enters., 682 F.
Supp. 1244, 1259 (D. Mass. 1985) (same); Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co.,
CONG.

183 Mich. App. 597, 604, 456 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (same).

55. See Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 1989)(holding
that §621(a)(2) of Cable Act does not authorize access to private easements); Media General
Cable Co. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 913 (E.D.
Va. 1990) (same); Cable Assocs., Inc. v. Town & Country Management Corp., 709 F. Supp.
582, 586 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (same).

1118

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1109

crucial second issue: whether the exercise of section 621(a)(2) cable access
in private easements causes a taking. 6 By comparing the courts' different
applications of takings law to section 621(a)(2) disputes, however, it becomes
evident that courts utilize a more reasoned approach when they analyze the
takings issue according to the amount of burden that section 621(a)(2) cable
access places on a landowner.17 With this takings law approach in mind, it
is possible to reconcile the dissenting courts with the interpretation that

section 621(a)(2) provides access to private easements. 51 Consideration of
any court's takings analysis, however, requires a brief introduction to takings
law.

Courts use two basic theories in takings law today.59 The first theory
notes that, even when the government does not invade or take title to
property, the government can regulate the use of property in such a way
that the government effectively "takes" the property. 60 The seminal opinion

comes from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon6l in which the United States
Supreme Court considered a Pennsylvania statute that regulated the mining
of coal. 62 The statute prohibited the mining of coal in such a way that
caused the subsidence of any building used for human habitation, but failed

to provide owners any compensation. 63 A mineral rights owner contested
the statute's validity claiming that the regulation was so extensive that it
effectively destroyed his use of the property, thus resulting in a taking
requiring compensation. 64 In considering whether the application of the

statute constituted a taking, Justice Holmes, writing for the majority,
observed that the difference between a permissible governmental regulation
and a taking was a matter of degree. 65 Holmes indicated that governments
could not function properly if governments had to compensate citizens for

every action that diminished property values.66 Holmes also noted, however,
that government interference could reach a certain degree at which the

56. See infra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing methods courts use to determine
whether §621(a)(2) cable access causes taking of private property).
57. See infra notes 78-193 and accompanying text (discussing and analyzing takings law
application of each line of cases that considers §621(a)(2) disputes).
58. See infra notes 97-134 and accompanying text (distinguishing dissenting courts' use
of per se takings analysis and reconciling dissenting courts with proposed interpretation of
§621(a)(2)).
59. See infra notes 60-77 and accompanying text (discussing two main theories of takings
law).
60. See R. ROTUNDA, J. NoWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONsTITurIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, §15:12, at 130 (West 1986) (explaining that government action
can "take" property even when no title passes to government).
61. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
62. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-413 (1922); see also R. ROTUNDA,

J. NowAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 60, §15.12, at 132 (describing Justice Holmes' observation
that difference between taking and regulation is matter of degree).
63. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
64. Id.at 403-04.
65. Id.at 413.
66. Id.
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diminution in value of the land required the government to compensate the
citizen. 67 Finding that the regulation in Pennsylvania Coal destroyed the
mineral rights owner's economic use of the property, Holmes held that the
regulation went too far and, therefore, was a taking requiring compensation. 6 Accordingly, this "regulatory takings" theory, as explicated by
Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal, holds that the government may regulate the
use of property for a permissible purpose to a certain extent, but if the
regulation of the use of the property lowers the value of the property too
69
much, the regulation amounts to a taking.
The second theory that courts apply to determine whether government
action constitutes a taking relies on the concept of government-backed
physical occupation of the land.70 The United States Supreme Court devel7
oped this per se view in Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. 1
In Pumpelly a state-sponsored dam project flooded a farmer's bottomland. 72
The state-backed dam builders argued that the harm was not a taking, but
73
rather a mere remote and consequential damage requiring no compensation.
To determine if the flooding constituted a taking, the Court considered
whether the inundation of the flood waters had ruined the use of the
farmer's land. 74 Finding that the flooding had ruined the use of the land,
the Pumpelly Court held that the occupancy was a taking. 7 The "occupancy" takings theory, therefore, holds that a taking occurs when the
government, or a government-backed entity, does not actually take title to
the land, but sponsors a permanent, physical occupation of the land so as
to effectively destroy the use of the property.7 6 Under both Pennsylvania
Coal's "regulatory takings" theory and Pumpelly's "occupancy" takings
77
theory, the usual approach of courts is an ad hoc factual inquiry.

67. Id.
68. Id. at 415.
69. Id.; see also Miller v. Shoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (using variation of Holmes' test
by considering constitutionality of statute by weighing resulting value to public versus loss to
private interest); but see Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundationsof Just Compensation Law, 80 H~Av. L. REv. 1165, 1194-95 (1967) (discussing
flaw in balancing test that loss to private interest is excluded from overall public interest and
weighed against public interest when private interest is actually part of overall public interest).
70. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (discussing "occupancy" theory of
takings law).
71. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
72. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 167 (1871).
73. Id. at 172.
74. Id. at 181.
75. Id.
76. Id.; see also R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YouNG, supra note 60, §15.12 at 140
(stating takings usually result from permanent, physical occupation that effectively destroys
use of property).
77. See L. TR, E, AimascA, CoNsnrtmoNA. LAw, §§9-4, 9-5, at 596, 599 (2d ed. 1988)
(stating usual approach to takings cases is ad hoc); R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YOUNG,
supra note 60, §15.12, at 131 (same); but see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (breaking with tradition by applying a perse takings approach);
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Courts considering whether the exercise of section 621(a)(2) cable access
in private easements would result in a taking apply either a "regulatory
takings" or "occupancy" takings theory.78 The first line of cases interpreting
section 621(a)(2), originating from within the Third Circuit, and one opinion
from the Eastern District of Virginia, (Third Circuit cases), holds that

"compatible" easements do not include private easements because the
permanent placement of cable wires in a private utility easement is an
"occupancy" amounting to a taking per se for which the Cable Act provides

no compensation. 79 For example, in Media General Cable of Fairfax, Inc.
v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners,80 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered whether section

621(a)(2) gave a cable television franchisee the right to lay cable wires in
private utility easements on an owner's development.81 The defendants in

Sequoyah were co-owners of a condominium development who had signed
an exclusive contract with a satellite television supplier.12 Media General,
the local cable franchisee, sought access through four easements it claimed
were compatible: the electric company easement, the telephone company

easement, the satellite television company easement, and a blanket utility
easement in the development's master deed. 3 The court reasoned that
allowing the cable company to lay wires in such easements would be a
permanent physical occupation of the easement space and therefore a taking
per se under the "occupancy" theory of takings law.8 4 Because the Sequoyah

court reasoned that section 621(a)(2) did not authorize a taking of private
85
property, the court held for the landowner.

see also L. TRIBE, supra, §9-5, at 602-04 (criticizing United States Supreme Court for rejecting
ad hoc approach in favor of per se rule in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982)).
78. Compare Media General Cable Co. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of CoOwners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 913 (E.D. Va. 1990) (using "occupancy" takings theory and
applying per se test to hold that §621(a)(2)'s authorization of physical occupation of easement
mandates taking of property) with Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp.,
902 F.2d 905, 911 (lth Cir. 1990) (utilizing "regulatory takings" analysis, but reasoning that
circumstances surrounding §621(a)(2) access indicate that no taking occurs per se) with Greater
Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enters., 682 F. Supp. 1244, 1259 (D. Mass. 1985)
(implementing "regulatory takings" analysis by determining whether right of access under
§621(a)(2) results in taking by amount of additional burden on owner).
79. See Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding
that §621(a)(2)'s "compatible" easements do not include private easements); Media General
Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners, 737 F. Supp. 903, 913 (E.D.
Va. 1990) (same); Cable Assocs., Inc. v. Town & Country Management Corp., 709 F. Supp.
582, 586 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (same).
80. 737 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. Va. 1990).
81. Media General Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners, 737
F. Supp. 903, 906 (E.D. Va. 1990).
82. Id. at 905.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 907.
85. Id. at 907; see also Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 162 (3d Cir.
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The Third Circuit cases apply the "occupancy" theory of takings law
to section 621(a)(2) disputes because of Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan
CA TV Corp.,86 a case the United States Supreme Court decided before
Congress enacted the Cable Act.87 In Loretto the Court considered the
constitutionality of a New York statute that required landlords to permit
88
the installation of cable television facilities upon the landlords' property.
The New York statute also prohibited landlords from demanding payment
from cable television companies in excess of the amount the State Commission on Cable Television determined reasonable. 9 The plaintiff in Loretto, a purchaser of an apartment building that had cable Wires and boxes
already attached to the roof and side, sued for damages and injunctive
relief, claiming that the New York statute authorized a taking without just
compensation." The Loretto Court noted that the ordinary inquiry into the
takings issue is based on the following criteria: the economic impact of the
regulation, the extent of interference with investment-backed expectations,
and the character of the governmental action. 9' The Court, however, observed that if a law authorizes a permanent physical occupation of an
owner's property, the character of the governmental action pursuant to the
law renders it a "taking per se."' The Court reasoned that New York's
statutorily approved, permanent physical occupation of property destroyed
not only the owner's right to possess the space and exclude others from it,
but also the owner's right to control the space and his right to dispose of
the space by transfer or sale. 93 Consequently, even though the cable wires
and boxes occupied only minimal space, the Loretto Court held that the
application of the New York statute constituted a takingY4 The Court then

1989)(holding that private easements were not "compatible" easements under §621(a)(2) of
Cable Act). The Woolley court considered whether §621(a)(2) of Cable Act authorized access
to the interior of an apartment building. Id. at 152. The cable system previously served the
owner's premises, but the owner disconnected the wires in order to establish a SMATV on
the premises. Id. at 152-53. The court noted that the legislative history of the Cable Act
authorized cable systems to use easements dedicated for electric, gas, or other utilities. Id. at
155. The court, however, found it critical that this legislative history did not say whether these
easements ran into, instead of just up to the buildings. Id. The court reasoned that granting
access to private easements would be a taking under "occupancy" theory of takings law. Id.
at 160. Because the court believed that §621(a)(2) did not authorize a taking, the court read
the statute narrowly as denying access to private easements to avoid the constitutional question
that would arise from a taking without just compensation. Id. at 159-60. Reasoning that
Congress' deletion of §633 implied that the Cable Act authorized no access in apartment
building access disputes, the court held for the owner. Id. at 162-63.
86. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
87. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
88. Id.at 421.
89. Id.

90. Id. at 424.
91. Id. at 426.
92. Id.

93. Id.at 435-36.
94. Id. at 441.
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remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount of compensation the State of New York must pay the landlord. 95 The opinion, however,
noted that its holding was very narrow and did not diminish a state's
substantial authority to impose appropriate restrictions on an owner's use
96
of his property.
The Third Circuit cases' reliance on Loretto's97 per se takings analysis

is problematical for two reasons.98 First, Loretto's "taking per se" holding
is an unreasonable extension from the "occupancy" theory of takings law.99
The "occupancy" theory, applied in Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi
Canal Co., l00 made the permanent physical occupation of land resulting in

the total loss of use of the land one of the factors in determining the
takings issue.' 0' The Pumpelly Court noted that the takings analysis had

leaned too far in favor of the government, holding that all kinds of
significant injuries to landowners were only consequential and, therefore,

not compensable. 0 2 The Pumpelly Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protected a landowner's rights, even if there has been no shift in title,
when the governmental action results in a permanent physical occupation
of the land that effectively destroys or impairs the landowner's use of the
property.103 The Court's narrow holding required the physical occupation
to be permanent and destructive of the usefulness of the land before the
physical occupation would constitute a taking) °4
The Court in Loretto, however, used the permanent physical occupation

of land factor to expand takings liability, regardless of the effect on the
usefulness of the land.105 Consequently, despite the trivial effect of the
occupation of cable boxes on Loretto's building, the Court found that the
state action was a taking per se.' 6 Justice Blackmun's dissent in Loretto
noted that the Court long had avoided applying an "inherently suspect"
per se takings analysis that depended on ancient distinctions between physical

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 158 (3d Cir. 1989) (analyzing
§621(a)(2)'s taking issue under Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982)); Media General Cable, Inc. v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners,
737 F. Supp. 903, 906-09 (E.D. Va. 1990) (same); Cable Assocs. v. Town & Country
Management Corp., 709 F. Supp. 582, 585 (E.D. Pa 1989) (same); see also Cable Holdings,
Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 871, 874 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (same).
98. See infra notes 99-130 and accompanying text (discussing problems in Third Circuit
cases' approach to §621(a)(2) disputes).
99. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text (describing occupancy theory of takings
law).
100. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872).
101. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1872).
102. Id. at 181.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426-27 (1982).
106. Id. at 441.
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and nonphysical occupation. 0 7 Blackmun further dismissed the majority's
19th century precedents as lacking any vitality in the "modern urban age". 108
As one commentator had noted several years before the Supreme Court
decided Loretto, one of the troublesome flaws of the physical occupation
test is that, when considering insignificant harms - such as those inherent
in the installation of subterranean utility lines - courts mechanically deem
the harm compensable if the harm involves governmental occupation of
private property, contrary to the premise that the size of the private loss is
a crucial factor.'09 The Loretto Court's "taking per se" analysis, therefore,
is a questionable extension of the physical occupation test." 0
A second flaw in the Third Circuit cases' Loretto-based "occupancy"
takings analysis is that, even if one accepts Loretto's extension of the
"taking per se" analysis, Loretto is distinguishable from factual situations
in which section 621(a)(2) is at issue."' The statute in Loretto prohibited
the landlord from interfering with the installation of cable services regardless
of which route the cable company took to enter the building, thus granting
a very broad right of access." 2 Section 621(a)(2), unlike Loretto, involves a
statute where access is limited to pre-existing "compatible" utility easements." 3 This distinction is important because the Loretto Court stressed
that the New York statute destroyed the owner's right to possess, control
or make non-possessory use of the occupied space." 4 Section 621(a)(2)
disputes are different because the Cable Act limits cable access to preexisting easements in which the owner's right to possess, control or make
non-possessory use of the property already is subordinate to that of the

107. Id. at 447 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 77, §9-5, at 603
(stating that Loretto's use of de minimis permanent physical invasions "borders on fetishism").
108. Id. at 446-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 77, §9-5, at
604 (noting that Loretto's holding is less fair and efficient than decision possibly could be
because of Court's reliance on common law legacies from 1890's).
109. See Michelman, supra note 69, at 1226-27 (describing flaw in physical occupation
test that many purely nominal harms become compensable merely because of resulting physical
occupation and without regard to size of private loss).
According to Michelman, the second flaw in the physical occupation test is that private
losses are deemed compensable or non-compensable according to the fortuitous circumstance
of whether a physical invasion is involved. Id. at 1226, see also Batten v. United States, 306
F.2d 580, 585 (10th Cir. 1962) (finding no taking of property because airplane flights did not
cross over plaintiffs' property, even though noise and smoke from idling and taxiing airplanes
decreased property values of plaintiffs' homes by thousands of dollars) cert. denied, 371 U.S.
955, reh'g denied, 372 U.S. 925 (1963).
110. See supra notes 99-109 and accompanying text (describing distinguishing characteristics between Loretto and Pumpelly).
11. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text (describing differences between Loretto
and §621(a)(2) disputes).
112. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 423 n.3.
(1982)(construing constitutionality of NEW YoRK Exac. LAW §828 (McKinney Supp. 1981-82)
which did not limit cable access to pre-existing easements).
113. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, §621(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. §541(a)(2) (1988).
114. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36.
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easement grantee." 5 For example, in Sequoyah the owner previously had
relinquished the exclusive right to occupy the space in question because the
space lay in one of the four easements.11 6 Because the right to occupy the
space was already divided among many entities, the cable company's placement of its wire in the easement was different from the state-backed
imposition on the landowner in Loretto." 7 The Loretto Court stated that
its narrow holding might have been different if the landowner had some
control over the placement, manner, and use of the cable access."' Section
621(a)(2) provides this control by limiting access to easements that are
"dedicated for electric, gas or other utility transmission"." 9 If an owner
still has room in the easement after the laying of the cable company's wires,
the court could grant access to the cable company without infringing on
the owner's rights.2 0 An owner would not feel any substantial impact unless
an extreme situation occurred, such as when the placement of the cable
company's wire leaves no more room in the easement.'2 ' Another reason
that Loretto is distinguishable from cases arising under section 621(a)(2) is
because the Loretto Court worried about the regulation's effect on the
owner's right to dispose of the property by transfer or sale. 122 In the section
621(a)(2) compatible easement situation, an owner's right to dispose of the
space by transfer or sale is not affected because his right to the easement,
2
and the right of his transferee, remains subordinate to the original grantee.'
Courts rely on Loretto because Congress addressed that case in the
legislative history of the Cable Act.24 The legislators' citation to Loretto,
115. See G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON TH- MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §427
(replacement ed. 1980) (stating that landowner has control over use of land up to point where
landowner's action interferes with grantee's use of easement); see also Mumaugh v. Diamond
Lake Area Cable TV Co., 183 Mich. App. 597, 604, 456 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Mich. Ct. App.
1990) (distinguishing Loretto from §621(a)(2) disputes involving pre-existing easements).
116. See Media General Cable v. Sequoyah Condominium Council of Co-Owners, 737 F.
Supp. 903, 905 (E.D. Va. 1990) (considering applicability of Cable Act §621(a)(2) access
through pre-existing easements).
117. See Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co., 183 Mich. App. 597, 604, 456

N.W.2d 425, 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990)(distinguishing Loretto situation from cases involving
pre-existing easements).
118. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 n.19 (1982).
119. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1 at 59, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws at 4696 (stating legislative history's definition of "compatible" easements).
120. See Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enters., 682 F. Supp. 1244,
1259 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding §621(a)(2) placement of cable access in easements does not
effectuate taking unless such access materially burdens owner's property).
121. Meyerson, supra note 14, at 611-12 (stating that one view of §621(a)(2) of Cable

Act is that cable operator can gain access only if pre-existing user of easement leaves adequate
room in easement).
122. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982).
123. See G. THOMPSON, supra note 115, at §427 (stating that landowner has control over
use of land up to point where landowner's action interferes with grantee's use of easement);
see also Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co., 183 Mich. App. 597, 604, 456
N.W.2d 425, 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (distinguishing Loretto from §621(a)(2) disputes

involving pre-existing easements).
124. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 80, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
ADMIN.

NEws at 4717.
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however, is misleading. 12 Congress discussed Loretto in the portion of the

legislative history regarding the then-present mandatory access to apartment
buildings wording of section 633, not in the portion of the legislative history
regarding section 621(a)(2)'s "compatible" easements. 26 Like the New York
statute in Loretto, section 633 did not limit cable company access to preexisting easements. 27 An owner who had complied with section 633 would
not have had any control over the installation of the cable wires.' 28 Just
because the drafters of the Cable Act felt they needed to comply with
Loretto when drafting section 633 does not necessarily mean that they would
have felt the same way when drafting section 621(a)(2).129 Section 633,
therefore, presents takings issues different from section 621(a)(2) because
access to pre-existing easements, while
section 621(a)(2) limits cable company
130
section 633 has no such limitation.
Because the Third Circuit cases rely heavily on a taking per se theory
that is distinguishable from the takings issue that arises when cable companies attempt to gain access through pre-existing easements, the Third

Circuit cases' holding that section 621(a)(2) does not authorize access to
private easements warrants some concern.' 3' Using a different takings theory,
the Third Circuit cases might have held that the exercise of section 621(a)(2)
access did not amount to a taking. 32 If these courts had held that section
621(a)(2) did not result in a taking, the Third Circuit cases might have held
that section 621(a)(2) authorizes access to private easements.133 Consequently,
if the Third Circuit cases had used a different takings theory, their holdings

125. See infra notes 126-30 (noting that citation to Loretto is in legislative history of
§633, not §621(a)(2)).
126. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 80, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADN.

NEWS at 4717.

127. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (discussing text of §633).
128. Id.; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435
(1982) (construing constitutionality of New York statute similar to §633 of Cable Act). The
Loretto statute, N.Y. Exac LAw §828(l) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82), merely prohibited a
landlord from interfering with the installation of cable facilities on his property. Id. at 423.
The statute did not proscribe certain designated avenues of entry for the cable company. Id.
The cable company could choose any route to install its wires, regardless of whether the owner
had conveyed that property to a utility company for an easement. Id. The particular property
used, therefore, may have been under the unitary ownership of the landlord. Id.
129. See supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text (distinguishing Loretto fact pattern
from §621(a)(2) disputes).
130. See Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co., 183 Mich. App. 597, 604, 456
N.W.2d 425, 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (distinguishing Loretto, which involved cable access
statute similar to deleted §633 of Cable Act, from §621(a)(2) cases involving pre-existing
easements).
131. See supra notes 97-130 and accompanying text (discussing problems in Third Circuit's
reliance on per se takings analysis).
132. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (noting that Third Circuit cases relied
on per se takings analysis to hold that exercise of §621(a)(2) cable access "takes" private
property).
133. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (describing Third Circuit cases' refusal to
extend §621(a)(2) access to private easements because access would effectuate taking).
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could be reconciled with the majority of courts which hold that section
34
621(a)(2)'s "compatible easements" do include private easements.
The question remains, however, which takings analysis the Third Circuit
cases should use in lieu of a taking per se test. The takings analyses used
by the remaining two lines of cases that have considered section 621(a)(2)
provide two possibilities. 35 The second of the three lines of cases interpreting

section 621(a)(2) also used a per se analysis on the takings issue, but reached
a different result than the Third Circuit cases. 3 6 This approach comes from

a number of Eleventh Circuit opinions, (Eleventh Circuit cases), a representative case being Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Development Corp.137 In White the plaintiff cable company sought access to the
defendant's 18,000 unit residential complex.' 38 The defendant sought to

exclude the plaintiff because the defendant made an exclusive agreement
with another cable company affiliated with the defendant."39 Instead of

reasoning that access to private easements was a taking per se like the Third
Circuit cases' approach, the Eleventh Circuit in White reasoned that cable4
access to an easement under section 621(a)(2) never resulted in a taking.' 0
134. Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 911 (11th
Cir. 1990) (holding §621(a)(2)'s "compatible" easements include private easements); Centel
Cable Television Co. v. Admiral's Cove Assoc., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363 (lth Cir. 1988) (same);
Centel Cable Television Co. v. Burg & DiVosta Corp., 712 F. Supp. 176, 178 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(same); Cable Holdings, Inc. v. McNeil Real Estate Fund VI, Ltd., 678 F. Supp. 871, 875
(N.D. Ga. 1986) (same); Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enters., 682 F.
Supp. 1244, 1259 (D. Mass. 1985) (same); Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co.,
183 Mich. App. 597, 604, 456 N.W.2d 425, 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (same).
135. See Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 90910 (lth Cir. 1990) (reasoning that circumstances surrounding §621(a)(2) access indicate that
no taking per se occurs); Greater Worcester Cablevision v. Carabetta Enters., 682 F. Supp.
1244, 1259 (D. Mass. 1985)(determining whether right of access under §621(a)(2) results in
taking by amount of additional burden on owner); see also infra notes 136-79 and accompanying
text (describing takings approaches of second and third lines of cases that have interpreted
§621(a)(2)).
136. See Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 90910 (lth Cir. 1990) (holding that §621(a)(2)'s "compatible" easements include private ease-

ments); Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral's Cove Assoc., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir.
1988) (same); see also infra notes 137-51 and accompanying text (discussing takings approach

of Eleventh Circuit cases).
137. 902 F.2d 905 (11th Cir. 1990).
138. Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 907 (lth
Cir. 1990).
139. Id. The defendant in White allowed the telephone and power companies access to
private roads while prohibiting the same access to plaintiff. Id. at 909. The White court relied
on the legislative history of the Cable Act which provides that any private agreements restricting
a cable system's right to use easements or rights-of-way granted to other utilities are not
enforceable. Id. at 909 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1 at 59, reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADKMN. NEws at 4696, stating any private arrangements which restrict
cable company's use of easements or rights-of-way are in violation of §621(a)(2)). The court
found the agreement to be in violation of the Cable Act legislative history prohibition on
private agreements that restrict cable access. Id.
140. Id. at 910 (holding that allowing cable company access under §621(a)(2) did not
result in taking because owner voluntarily granted easement to utilities at earlier time).
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In effect, the White court implied that the exercise of section 621(a)(2) was

a regulation that never went "too far". 141 The court rationalized that, if an
owner or developer voluntarily granted an easement to a utility, then
Congress had the authority to grant access to any additional occupier without
causing a taking of the property contained in that easement.142 In holding

that Cable Act section 621(a)(2) authorized access to private easements, the
the defendant
White court concluded that the district court properly enjoined
43
landowner from denying access to the cable company.

The Eleventh Circuit cases have dismissed any takings issues based on44
the fact that the owner had voluntarily granted an easement to a utility.
These cases extracted the "voluntary" rationale from Federal Communications Commission v. Florida Power Corp. 45 In FloridaPower the United
States Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the Pole Attach-

ments Act, 1 46 which gives the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
power to regulate the rates a utility charges cable companies for the use of

141. See supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text (discussing "regulatory takings"
approach to takings law).
142. White, 902 F.2d at 910.
143. Id.
The White court based its holding on an earlier Eleventh Circuit case. Id. See Centel
Cable Television Co. v. Admiral's Cove Assocs., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363 n.7 (11th Cir. 1988)
(reasoning that no taking occurred because owner voluntarily granted easement to utility). In
Admiral's Cove the court considered whether the plaintiff had an implied right of action to
move for a preliminary injunction under §621(a)(2) of the Cable Act. Id. at 1360. The
defendant owned a developing residential community, and denied the cable company access to
the community. Id. The defendant challenged the plaintiff's right to sue contending that the
"compatible easements" of §621(a)(2) were only public easements. Id. at 1362-63. The
defendant reasoned that a franchising agent such as the city usually owned these public
easements and, therefore, that the cable company had to petition the city to sue on the cable
company's behalf. Id. The defendant also contended that the Cable Act did not authorize the
use of private easements because Loretto indicated that such authorization would be an
unconstitutional taking. Id. at 1363 n.7. The court rejected the defendant's argument that the
use of private utility easements would be a taking on the basis that most developers voluntarily
grant easements to utilities. Id. Because the owner voluntarily had granted the easement, the
court reasoned that Congress had the authority to allow a cable company also to use the
easement without violating the takings clause. Id. The court stated further that a private right
of action was consistent with the Cable Act's scheme of promoting the growth and development
of cable television and, therefore, held that the plaintiff had an implied right of action. Id.
at 1364.
144. See Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Development Corp., 902 F.2d
905, 910 (11th Cir. 1990) (dismissing any takings challenges to §621(a)(2) of Cable Act because
owner "voluntarily" gave up his easement); Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral's Cove
Assoc., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363 n.7 (l1th Cir. 1988) (same).
The White and Admiral's Cove courts never reached the statutory interpretation question
whether §621(a)(2)(C)'s provisions compensated for a taking because the courts reasoned that
no taking resulted from the application of §621(a)(2). White, 902 F.2d at 910; Admiral's Cove,
835 F.2d at 1363 n.7.
145. 480 U.S. 245 (1987).
146. Pole Attachments Act of 1978, 47 U.S.C. §224 (1988).
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the utility company's poles. 47 Three cable operators sued Florida Power
under the Pole Attachments Act and won an FCC order reducing their
rents from approximately $7.00 per pole to $1.79 per pole. 148 Florida Power
appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
following Loretto, held that the Pole Attachments Act mandated that the
court find that the FCC had taken property without providing just compensation. 49 On appeal, the Supreme Court distinguished the New York
statute in Loretto on the ground that the New York statute involved forced
governmental access to a landlord's property while the Pole Attachments
Act in Florida Power merely regulated commercial leases already "voluntarily" established between cable companies and the property owner.15 0 The
Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and held that the Pole At5
tachments Act did not constitute a taking and was constitutionally valid.' '
The Eleventh Circuit cases' use of the "voluntary" takings analysis does
not consider adequately the takings issues that may arise in certain cases
under section 621(a)(2). 52 For example, this analysis does not consider the
circumstances under which the landowner originally granted the easement
53
which the cable company claims is "dedicated for compatible uses".
Perhaps the "voluntary" grant of easements by the landowner was not
voluntary at all but a necessary part of the zoning and building permit
process. 54 If the landowner did not voluntarily grant the easement, section
621(a)(2)'s appropriation of the owner's land does not resemble Florida
Power, in which the utility company willingly granted easements to the
56
cable company. 55 The takings issue requires a more complex analysis.
Additionally, the "voluntary" analysis used by the Eleventh Circuit cases
applies a blanket "no taking per se" test that does not allow for consideration of the unusual circumstances which may arise because of the
application of section 621(a)(2). 57 In an extreme situation, the cable company's placement of one more wire in the easement may leave no more

147. Federal Communications Comm'n v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 247-48
(1987).
148. Id. at 248-49.
149. Id. at 250.
150. Id. at 252-53.
151. Id. at 254.
152. See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text (discussing flaws in Eleventh Circuit
cases' "voluntary" takings analysis).
153. See supra notes 136-51 and accompanying text (discussing Eleventh Circuits cases'
takings analysis).
154. See FERuus, supra note 6, at 253 (noting problem may arise when "voluntary"
granting of easement is not really voluntary).
155. See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 248
(1987) (considering constitutionality of Pole Attachments Act which regulated existing landlordtenant relationships between utilities and cable companies).
156. See infra notes 212-50 and accompanying text (discussing factors court should use
to consider whether burden on landowner from §621(a)(2) cable access rises to level of taking).
157. See infra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (discussing extreme situation where
cable company's placement of wire leaves no more room in easement).

1991]

MATERIAL BURDEN TEST

1129

room in the easement. 15 In such a case, allowing the cable company access
under the Cable Act effectively destroys the owner's right to add any more
wires to his easement. 15 9 An ad hoc analysis would provide a safety valve
for these situations, and would be more consistent with the general approach
that courts use in takings cases when the impairment of the owner's use of
his land is at issue.16°
Contrary to both the "taking per se" approach of the Third Circuit
cases and the Eleventh Circuit cases' "voluntary" takings analysis, the third
of the three lines of cases interpreting section 621(a)(2)'s takings issue uses
an ad hoc analysis.' 6' This "regulatory takings" approach, consistent with
most approaches to the takings clause, is flexible enough -to consider
adequately the takings issue in the fact specific cases arising under the Cable
Act. 6 2 This line of cases determines whether section 621(a)(2) cable company
access results in a taking according to the degree the access materially
burdens the owner's property rights, (material burden cases). 63 In Greater
Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enterprises, Inc.,' 64 the plaintiff
sought injunctive and equitable relief to allow him access to an apartment
complex through telephone, natural gas, and electric easements. 6 The
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reasoned that
whether allowing the cable company access under section 621(a)(2) constituted a taking depended on whether the use of these easements amounted
to an additional burden on the underlying property.1'6 The district court
found that granting access did not amount to an additional burden and,
therefore, held that granting access would not result in a taking. 167

158. See Meyerson, supra note 14, at 611-12 (stating that one view of §621(a)(2) of Cable
Act is that cable operator can gain access only if pre-existing user of easement leaves adequate
room).
159. See supra notes 136-51 and accompanying text (describing Eleventh Circuit's takings
analysis in which court gives no consideration to size of easement at issue).
160. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (stating that courts usually use ad hoc
approach when considering impairment of use of property).
161. See infra notes 162-79 and accompanying text (describing material burden cases'
approach to §621(a)(2) disputes).
162. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (stating that courts usually use ad hoc
approach when considering impairment of use of property).
163. See Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enters., Inc., 682 F. Supp.
1244, 1259 (D. Mass. 1985) (determining whether or not right of access under §621(a)(2) results
in a taking by amount of additional burden on owner); Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area
Cable TV Co., 183 Mich. App. 597, 605, 456 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Mich Ct. App. 1990) (same).
164. 682 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Mass. 1985).
165. Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta Enters., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1244,
1246 (D. Mass. 1985).
166. Id. at 1259.
167. Id. Despite finding that §621(a)(2) did not result in a taking of the owner's property,
the Greater Worcester court never fully reached the issue of congressional intent behind the
deletion of §633 because the plaintiff could not access the defendants building solely through
compatible easements. Id.
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In Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co.' 61 the Michigan
Court of Appeals also applied the material burden test in considering
whether section 621(a)(2) applied to private easements. 69 The plaintiffs were
property owners holding their land subject to a pole line easement by

Indiana & Michigan Electric Company (I & M).1 70 When the cable company
attached wires to I & M's utility poles over the plaintiffs' land, the plaintiffs
brought a trespass and quantum meruit suit.' 7' The defendant cable company
72

contended that section 621(a)(2) granted the defendant a right of access.
The court reasoned that the original easement grantee presumably had
compensated the owner already for the use of the owner's property because
the cable company was using an existing pole line easement. 7 Finding that

the plaintiffs failed to show a material increase of the burden on their
property, the court determined that a grant of cable access under section
621(a)(2) caused no taking. 74 Consequently, the court allowed the cable

168. 183 Mich. App. 597, 456 N.W.2d 425 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
169. Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co., 183 Mich. App. 597, 606, 456
N.W.2d 425, 430 (Mich Ct. App. 1990).
170. Id. at 597, 456 N.W.2d at 427.
171. Id. at 599, 456 N.W.2d at 427.
172. Id. at 600, 456 N.W.2d at 427.
173. Id. at 606, 456 N.W.2d at 430.
174. Id., 456 N.W.2d at 430. The court in Mumaugh went so far as to speculate that
Congress' enactment of §621(a)(2) may rise to a legislative determination that the use of
preexisting utility easements by cable television companies do not materially overburden the
owner's easements. Id. at 607-08, 456 N.W.2d at 431.
A Federal District court in Delaware took an interesting approach to a mandatory cable
access statute in Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v. Saienni Enters. 633 F. Supp. 1315, 1320 (D. Del
1986). The Delaware statute, DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 26, §613 (1974), provides that, wherever a
public utility owns or maintains poles, wires, cables, conduits or other facilities in or on a
property, a cable franchisee may acquire an easement, for the purpose of erecting and
maintaining a cable system, "by a taking ... if the easement should impose any additional
burden on the property interest of the utilities or any other concern or person." Rollins at
1321. When considering the issue of mandatory access to an apartment building, the court
construed both the Delaware statute and §621(a)(2) of the Cable Act. Id. The cable company
in Rollins sought to enjoin the owner of apartments from removing its cable system to set up
a SMATV. Id. at 1315-16. The court reasoned that the Delaware law gives cable companies a
greater right of access than §621(a)(2) of the Cable Act because the Delaware law permits
access via the construction of the cable company's own poles and wires, not just through
compatible easements. Id. at 1322 n.2. This right of access applies to all apartment buildings
because its impossible to conceive of a building not served by electric, telephone, water or
sewer easements. Id. at 1322. The Rollins court stated that a taking would occur when the
access put any burden on the owner. Id. The court declared that the statute provided sufficient
compensation for any taking that occurred. Id. Because the Delaware statute's compensation
provisions are similar to those under the Cable Act, the court held that the two statutes were
compatible. Id. Finding that a right of access did not violate either law, the court enjoined
the owner from denying access to this apartment building. Id.
Subsequently, in a memorandum opinion, the court granted the cable company's motion
for a partial summary judgment on the question of right of access. Rollins Cablevue, Inc. v.
Saienni Enters., Civ-A 86-139-JRR (D. Del Apr. 28, 1987) (WESTLAW, 1987 WL 54378).
Whether the owner had been compensated for the use of the easement was a question of fact
not decided at that time. Id.
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company access to the private pole line easement. 75 The court's decision
limited compensation to the amount of damages resulting from installation
76
as provided under section 621(a)(2)(C).'
Under this approach, if an owner can show that access amounts to a
material burden, the access will result in a taking. 77 These courts reason
that, if access is granted to a private easement that does not amount to an
additional burden on the owner's land, then no taking occurs because the
original grantee presumably had compensated the owner for the use of the
easement at an earlier time. 78 The only compensation that may be necessary
is for damages incurred at the time of installation, and section 621(a)(2)(C)
79
provides such compensation.
The approaches of the Third Circuit cases, the Eleventh Circuit cases,
and the material burden cases all provide plausible interpretations of the
takings issues arising under section 621(a)(2).1s0 The material burden cases'
approach, however, is preferential for several reasons.'' First, the material
burden test's ad hoc approach is consistent with the courts' usual approach
to takings issues.8 2 An ad hoc approach, while less predictable than the
application of a definite test, is the best approach that courts have been
able to develop when deciding whether a regulation imposes enough of an
imposition on a landowner that it goes "too far". 8 3 Courts hardly are
justified to abandon the history of successful balancing tests for the arithmetical application of common-law per se tradition merely because some
8 4
government action imposes a trivial burden on a landowner.
Second, the material burden teft is more consistent with the compromise
of the Cable Act.8 5 The ability of the material burden test to analyze the
175. Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co., 183 Mich. App. 597, 606, 456
N.W.2d 425, 430 (Mich Ct. App. 1990).
176. Id.; 456 N.W.2d at 430.
177. See Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc., v. Carabetta Enters., Inc., 682 F. Supp.
1244, 1259 (D. Mass. 1985) (determining whether or not right of access under §621(a)(2) results
in taking by amount of additional burden on owner); Mumaugh, 183 Mich. App. at 605, 456
N.W.2d at 430 (same).
178. See Mumaugh, 183 Mich. App. at 606, 456 N.W.2d at 427 (reasoning that original
grantee presumably compensated landowner already).
179. See id. (reasoning that cable operator owes landowner no just compensation when
cable access places no material burden on landowner's property).
180. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text (describing lack of judicial consensus
on interpretation of term "compatible" easements in Cable Act §621(a)(2)). 181. See infra notes 182-210 and accompanying text (comparing material burden cases'
approach to §621(a)(2) of Cable Act with Third and Eleventh Circuits' approaches).
182. See L. TRIE, supra note 77, §§9-4, 9-5, at 596, 599 (2d ed. 1988) (stating usual
approach to takings cases is ad hoc); R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YOUNG, supra note 60,
§15.12, at 131 (same).
183. See L. TRmE, supra note 77, §9-4, at 595-96 (conceding that distinguishing permissible
regulation from taking is most difficult problem that courts face in modem land-use law).
184. L. TamE, supra note 77, §9-5, at 604-05 (criticizing per se approaches to takings
issue).
185. See infra notes 186-93 and accompanying text (describing consistency between material
burden test's consideration of burden on landowner and Cable Act §621(a)(2)'s compromise
between First Amendment and property rights).
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takings issue on an ad hoc basis enables courts to consider the complex
property and free speech interests involved in section 621(a)(2) disputes.8 6
The drafters of the Cable Act did not intend section 621(a)(2)'s advancement
of First Amendment rights to trump a landowner's Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment property rights.1 7 Conversely, Congress did not intend for a
landowner to use his property rights to edit his tenant's access to information.' Approaches that use a per se takings analysis sway the balance
too far in favor of either free speech or property rights. 189 For example,
the Third Circuit cases' approach denies access to all private easements,
regardless of the possible trivial effect of cable access on an owner's already
burdened easements, thereby frustrating the free speech rights enshrined in
the First Amendment. 19° The Eleventh Circuit cases' approach does the
opposite because, in extreme cases, this approach would trample the owner's
Fifth Amendment protections for the vindication of First Amendment
rights. 91 Keeping in mind the apparent middle ground approach between
property rights and First Amendment rights taken in the legislative re-

186. See supra notes 32-38 and 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing competing First
Amendment and property rights involved in §621(a)(2) disputes).
187. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note I at 36-37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMN. NEWS at 4673 (noting that Cable Act represents careful balance between

First Amendment rights of tenants and property rights of landowners).
188. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note I at 36-37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmn. NEws at 4673 (noting that regulation of consumer access to cable television
was necessary to prevent landlords from becoming electronic editors for their tenants, but also
implying that Cable Act access provisions must consider property rights of landlords).
189. See supranotes 79-85 and accompanying text (describing Third Circuit cases' approach
denying cable access to all easements that are not dedicated for public uses); see also supra
notes 158-60 and accompanying text (describing how, in extreme cases, Eleventh Circuit's "no
taking per se" approach can fail to find taking even though owner faces substantial hardship).
190. See Michelman, supra note 69, at 1226-27 (describing flaw in physical occupation
test that many purely nominal harms become compensable merely because of resulting physical
occupation and without regard to size of private loss); compare supra notes 15-24 and
accompanying text (discussing Cable Act's concern about First Amendment rights of broadcasters and listeners) with Cable Investments, Inc. v. Woolley, 867 F.2d 151, 161 (3d Cir.

1989) (holding that refusal to grant cable company access to private easements did not violate
cable company's First Amendment right because development was not equivalent of "company
town" in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)) [and] Cox Cable San Diego, Inc. v.
Bookspan, 195 Cal. App. 3d 22, 28-30, 240 Cal. Rptr. 407, 411 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that owner's exclusion of cable company from apartment building did not violate cable
company's First Amendment rights).
In Cox Cable, the court denied the cable company's First Amendment argument because
the owner was a private citizen, and the apartment building was not analogous to PruneYard
as the public was not invited to gather there. 195 Cal. App. 3d at 28-30, 240 Cal. Rptr. at
411. Rather, tenants could exclude the public by retreating to their apartments and locking
their doors. Id. at 29, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 411. The court compared cable company's First
Amendment right to access request to that of a newspaper cutting slots in apartment doors so
that it could deliver its papers directly. Id. at 30, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 411.
191. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (describing how, in extreme cases,
Eleventh Circuit's "no taking per se" approach can fail to find taking even though owner
faces substantial hardship).
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drafting of section 621(a)(2)19 2, the -material burden test more effectively
meets this compromise because the material burden test offers courts the
ability to grant access to cable companies on a case-by-case basis, depending
on the hardships present in each case. 93
The Supreme Court case of PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins 94
supports the proposition that courts should apply a "regulatory takings"
analysis to cases in which free speech rights conflict with property rights. 19
In PruneYard the Supreme Court considered whether state restrictions on
196
an owner's right to exclude others from his property amounted to a taking.
The owner of a shopping center sought to exclude students seeking signatures
for a political petition but the students challenged the owner under the free
speech provisions of the California Constitution. 97 Although the students
sought access to the owner's property, the Court used a "regulatory takings"
analysis rather than an "occupancy" takings analysis.'98 The Court reasoned
that not every physical occupation of property amounts to a taking in the
Constitutional sense29 The PruneYard Court noted that, when the occupation of property by persons exercising First Amendment rights does not
unreasonably impair the value or use of the property, the grant of access
would not result in a taking. 200 The Court implied that a regulation only
goes "too far" when it is inequitable for the property owner to bear the
public burden of the regulation alone. 20' The Court noted that the shopping
center owner had not shown that the right to exclude others was essential
to the use or economic value of his property. 2 2 Because allowing the citizens
to exercise their freedom of speech on the owner's property, subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restraints, did riot unreasonably impair
the value or use of the shopping center, the PruneYard Court held that the
state restrictions on the owner's right to exclude others from his property
did not rise to the level of a taking. 20 a
Applying PruneYard to section 621(a)(2) disputes, a court should determine whether the laying of one more cable line in the easement would

192. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (describing effect of Cable Act
amendment 15 on balance of First Amendment and property rights).
193. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1 at 36-37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADxw. NEws at 4673 (stating how Cable Act reflects balance between First
Amendment and property rights); see Meyerson, supra note 14, at 545 (noting that key to
understanding Cable Act is to view it as compromise).
194. 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see also supra notes 60-69 and accompanying text (describing
"regulatory takings" analysis).
195. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
196. Id. at 79-80.
197. Id. at 77-79.
198. Id. at 83 (citing Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
199. Id. at 82-83.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 84.
203. Id. at 83.
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unreasonably impair the economic value or use of the property to the

owner. 204 If not, the cable line's physical appropriation of land would not
rise to the level of a taking. 2 5 The court also should remember that access
disputes under section 621(a)(2) involve easements in which the owner's
right to exclude others is already subordinate to outside parties. 206 The owner
would have difficulty demonstrating how a grant of access to an already
burdened easement unreasonably would impair the economic value of his
20

property. 2°7 The owner, however, should be afforded this opportunity.
The material burden test, unlike the Third and Eleventh Circuit approaches,
grants the owner an opportunity to prove that the addition of one more
cable line in an easement may cause the owner sufficient hardship to render
2°9
the application of section 621(a)(2) a taking.
As shown, the material burden test provides an analysis that is both
consistent with the Supreme Courts' usual approach to takings issues and
is flexible enough to consider the competing interests at stake in section
621(a)(2) disputes. 210 Returning to the proposed interpretation of section
621(a)(2) and updating it accordingly, it now is possible to conclude that
section 621(a)(2) provides access to private easements and that courts should
decide, using the material burden test on an ad hoc basis, whether a grant
of access under section 621(a)(2) amounts to a taking. 21I The question
remains how to measure whether an owner has suffered a material burden
and specifically, what factors a court should consider when applying the
material burden test.
The PruneYard Court noted three factors relevant to the determination
of when a government regulation amounted to a taking: the character of
the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with
reasonable investment-backed expectations. 212 The Court determined that

204. See id. at 82-83 (deciding whether landowner must allow access to his property for
exercise of free speech by analyzing impairment of use of his property).
205. See R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK, & J. YOUNG, supra note 60, at §15.12 (concluding
permanent physical occupation usually results in taking, but noting that court may have
difficulty determining when government action transfers traditional property rights in some
cases like PruneYard).
206. See Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co., 183 Mich. App. 597, 604, 456
N.W.2d 425, 429 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (distinguishing Loretto from §621(a)(2) disputes
involving pre-existing easements).
207. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982)
(noting that important factor in PruneYard's holding that occupation did not constitute taking
was that owner had not exhibited interest in excluding all persons from his property).
208. See supranotes 158-60 and accompanying text (noting that in extreme cases, placement
of one more wire in easement may leave no room for owner).
209. See supra notes 161-79 and accompanying text (describing material burden cases'
approach to §621(a)(2) disputes).
210. See supra notes 181-93 and accompanying text (listing two reasons why material
burden test provides better takings approach than those used by Third and Eleventh Circuits).
211. See supra notes 48-58 and accompanying text (proposing that §621(a)(2) authorizes
access to private easements).
212. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
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the character of the governmental action in PruneYard - allowing access
to a shopping mall - was not determinative of a taking because the access
was subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restraints.2 1 3 As shown
above, section 621(a)(2) also has a restraint because that section limits cable
access solely to "compatible" easements. 214 Because both the section 621(a)(2)
and PruneYard restraints limit free speech access in such a way that the
access does not interfere with the owner's use of the property, the character
of section 621(a)(2) access is similar enough to the character of the governmental action in PruneYard that it also should not be determinative of a
taking.215 Landowners, however, may argue that the character of governmental action under section 621(a)(2) is a permanent, physical invasion and,
therefore, the character of governmental action is determinative of a taking
under the reasoning in Loretto.21 6 Courts should reject this argument because
217
the situation in Loretto is distinguishable from section 621(a)(2) disputes.
The only instance in which the character of the governmental action may
be determinative occurs when the cable system access interferes with the
normal use of the easement. 2 8 If the cable company's use of the easement

213. Id. at 83-84.
214. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, §621(a)(2), 47 U.S.C. §541(a)(2) (1988).
215. See PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83-84 (reasoning that "physical occupation" nature of
governmental action does not result in taking when owner can limit access to minimize
interference with property's function).
216. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)
(holding that when state action involves permanent physical invasion of land, character of
governmental action is determinative of taking issue).
217. See supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text (contending §621(a)(2)'s limitation on
cable access to "compatible" easements distinguishes §621(a)(2) from per se rule of Loretto);
see also supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text (noting criticism of Loretto's per se test).
The reader also should note the owner's possible claim that he is suffering a material
burden because his First Amendment rights are violated by a statute allowing others access to
his property for free speech purposes. See Greater Worcester Cablevision, Inc. v. Carabetta
Enters., Inc., 682 F. Supp. 1244 (D. Mass. 1985). In Greater Worcester, the court also
considered the issue of a cable company's right of access under MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
166A, §22 (1976), a Massachusetts statute similar to the now discarded Cable Act section 633.
Id. The owner claimed that the statute forced him to allow a government sponsored speaker
access to his property, thus violating his First Amendment rights. Id. at 1247. The court
reasoned that PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), governed the case.
Greater Worcester, 682 F. Supp. at 1255. The PruneYard Court held that the governmental
action did not rise to the level of a taking because the mall owner had invited the public onto
his property and allowing the citizens to exercise their freedom of speech, subject to reasonable
time, place, and manner restraints, did not unreasonably impair the value or use of the
shopping center. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83. In Greater Worcester, the court found that the
owner also decided to invite the public onto his property - he even leased property to the
public. Greater Worcester, 682 F. Supp. at 1255. The court further found that the state, like
the state in PruneYard, did not dictate what message a speaker must convey. Id. Additionally,
following PruneYard, the Greater Worcester court found no reason why persons would assume
that the owner endorsed the messages of the speaker. Id. Consequently, the Greater Worcester
court held that the Massachusetts statute did not violate the owner's First Amendment rights.
Id.
218. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (describing extreme situation where
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leaves no room for the owner, the character of the governmental action is
different and may rise to a material burden. 2 9 Because this only occurs in
extreme cases, the character of governmental action factor seldom adds
much to the material burden analysis. 220
The second factor that courts should consider is the economic impact
of section 621(a)(2) access on the owner?'21 Courts should consider many
variables under this factor.' One variable is the amount of money that a
landowner will lose as a result of cable access.m For example, an owner
may lose some wealth if the owner has a contract with a satellite company
that pays the owner a proportional share of revenues generated from the
owner's property. 224 This loss could be substantial in some very large

developments like the 18,000 residence development in White. 25 Courts,
however, should consider two details before determining that an owner's

revenue sharing loss rises to the level of a material burden. 226 First, cable
company access only may prevent the owner from gaining a monopoly
profit via the SMATV system revenue sharing arrangement. 227 Because
Congress noted that revenue sharing practices between system operators and
landowners could undermine the purposes of the Cable Act, the loss of the

owner's revenue sharing profits should not weigh heavily in the owner's
favor.m Second, the owner's land may rise in value due to the condomicable company's placement of wire fills up easement so that owner may not "effectively" use
easement).
219. See H.R. No. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §633(b)(1)(D) (1984), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 13 (1984) (including consideration of extent to which
facilities actually occupied the premises among just compensation factors in deleted §633 of
Cable Bill).
220. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text (noting that interference with owner's
use of easement occurs only in extreme situations).
221. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court test's three factors
to measure whether regulation amounts to taking).
222. See infra notes 223-34 and accompanying text (describing possible ways §621(a)(2)'s
mandatory access may interfere with owner's economic situation).
223. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 82, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
&An N. NEws at 4719 (noting landlords often have revenue sharing contracts with SMATV's).
224. See id. (implying that cable access to premises would reduce SMATV revenues, thus
reducing landowner's share of those revenues).
225. See Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905, 907
(11th Cir. 1990) (considering cable access to huge development capable of accommodating
18,000 homes).
226. See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances that moderate
economic impact of §621(a)(2) cable access on landowner).
227. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 82, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CoNo.
& ADmIN. NEws at 4719 (expressing concern over revenue sharing agreements because they
are one of main reasons why landlords deny cable company requests to serve landlord's
property); see also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (stating that courts view loss of
future profits as less compelling factor than loss of other property interests when considering
takings issues).
228. See H.R. REP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 82, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AnmN. NEws at 4719 (noting revenue sharing contracts may undermine purposes of Cable
Act).

1991]

MATERIAL BURDEN TEST

1137

nium's increased attractiveness to a prospective tenant because the tenant
now has a choice of television systems. 229 If the land value increases due to
cable access, courts should balance this rise in value with any negative
economic impact on the owner resulting from cable access. 20
In determining the economic impact of section 621(a)(2) access, courts
also should consider whether the original grantee compensated the owner
for the use of the easement. 2?' If the original grantee already paid the owner
for the use of the easement, the owner's task of showing that his burden
is material would be more difficult. 232 Another variable courts should
consider is whether cable access would cause any long-term damage to the
cause long-term damage,
facilities? 3 If section 621(a)(2) cable access does
24
such damage may effectuate a material burden. 1
A third factor courts should consider is whether the granting of cable
access would interfere with the owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations. 23s If the owner can prove that cable access through compatible
easements changes the investment value of his property, he may be able to
show a material burden. 236 Two United States Supreme Court cases provide
guidance for application this factor. 2 7 In Kaiser Aetna v. United States218
the Court considered whether the United States Corps of Engineers constitutionally could compel the public use of a private marina. 2 9 The landowners
in Kaiser invested considerable amounts of money turning a pond into an
exclusive marina.m The Corps of Engineers sought public access to the
229. See H.R. No. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §633(b)(1)(D) (1984), reprinted in H.R.
RaP. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 13 (1984) (including rise in value of property resulting from
availability of cable system among factors in deleted §633 measuring amount of just compensation due to owner because of cable access).
230. See id. (considering rise in value of owner's land due to cable access).
231. See Mumaugh v. Diamond Lake Area Cable TV Co., 183 Mich. App. 597, 605, 456
N.W.2d 425, 430 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that, in situation of utility pole line easements,
where previous grantee already compensated owner, court raises presumption that cable access
did not burden property).
232. See id. (stating that owner faces presumption that cable access does not burden
property when previous grantee compensated owner for use of easement).
233. See H.R. No. 4103, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. §633(b)(1)(D) (1984), reprinted in H.R.
REp. No. 98-934, supra note 1, at 13 (1984) (including actual long term damage that cable
access may cause to premises among just compensation factors in deleted §633).
234. See id. (listing long-term damage as factor in determining amount of just compensation due to landowner).
235. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting Supreme Court test's three factors
to measure whether regulation goes so far as to be taking).
236. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980) (stating that
if government's attempt to create public right of access interferes with owner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations then government action "takes" owner's property).
237. Compare PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 84 (holding-that "interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations" did not result in a taking) with Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979) (holding that "interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations" did rise to level of taking).
238. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
239. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
240. Id. at 167-68.
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marina because the landowners dredged a channel connecting the pond to
a nearby ocean, which technically created navigable waters. 241 The Court
reasoned that compelling public access to this property would cause a
substantial devaluation of the owner's property and would amount to a
taking. 242 Consequently, the Court held that the United States must compensate the owner if it classified the pond as navigable waters.2 3
2
In the second illustrative case, PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, "
the Court distinguished Kaiser Aetna.245 The owner in PruneYard had not
based his investment on the fact that the land would be exclusive and
private like the marina owner in Kaiser.246 In fact, the owner had counted
on the property being extensively used by the public?27 The Court determined
that the owner did not prove how granting a right of access for students
seeking petition signatures would interfere with the owner's investmentbacked expectations? 8s Accordingly, the Court held that the owners reasonable investment-backed expectations were not a dispositive factor in the
case.? 9 Under PruneYard and Kaiser Aetna, a court facing a section
621(a)(2) cable access issue should examine whether forced cable access
20
would affect the property's investment value.
The material burden test provides the more reasoned analysis than either
the Third Circuit or Eleventh Circuit approaches for several reasons. 25' First,
the material burden test's ad hoc approach follows the approach courts
usually employ in takings analysis? 2 Second, the material burden test closely
follows the compromise of section 621(a)(2) and the deletion of section
633.253 The material burden test requires that a court not look at the trivial
impact of the access, but rather at the economic burdens on the owner to
develop a better compromise between the owner's loss and the First Amendment rights to maintain a free flow of a diversity of information between
cable companies and tenants. 254 Consequently, courts should apply a material

241. Id. at 167.
242. Id. at 178-80.
243. Id. at 180.
244. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
245. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See supra notes 237-49 and accompanying text (describing applications of "interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations" factor).
251. See infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text (summarizing attributes of material
burden test).
252. See supra notes 59-77 and accompanying text (describing two basic approaches to
takings issue and noting that usual analysis under both takings approaches is ad hoc).
253. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text (contending that middle ground
approach of material burden test reflects compromise in Cable Act better than perse approaches
of Third and Eleventh Circuits).
254. See supra notes 212-50 and accompanying text (describing application of the material
burden test).
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burden test to section 621(a)(2) disputes.255 If the dissenting courts in the
Third Circuit cases' had employed a material burden test to the circumstances of those cases, these courts might have held that the exercise of
section 621(a)(2) access did not result in a taking. 256 In the future, courts
such as the Third Circuit should hold that section 621(a)(2) authorizes access
to private easements.2 7 Such a finding would reconcile the Third Circuit
cases with the majority of courts' holdings that section 621(a)(2) authorizes
access to private easementsY s
MATTHEW P. PRITTS

255. See supra notes 180-93 and accompanying text (concluding that material burden test
applies more reasoned approach to takings issues in §621(a)(2) disputes).
256. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (noting that Third Circuit courts applied
per se takings analysis and held that exercise of §621(a)(2) cable access "takes" private
property).
257. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (describing Third Circuit's refusal to
authorize §621(a)(2) access to private easements because such access would effectuate a taking).
258. See, e.g., Centel Cable Television Co. v. Thos. J. White Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 905,
911 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that "compatible easements" of Cable Act include private utility
easements); Centel Cable Television Co. v. Admiral's Cove Assoc., 835 F.2d 1359, 1363 (11th
Cir. 1988) (same); Centel Cable Television Co. v. Burg & DiVosta Corp., 712 F. Supp. 176,
178 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (same).

